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ABSTRACT / KEYWORDS

This study empirically examines the relationship between top management team (TMT)
heterogeneity and firm performance for a sample of multinational enterprises (MNEs)
headquartered in 31 countries from across the globe. Utilizing the theoretical perspectives of
upper echelons (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and information processing (Daft, Bettenhausen, &
Tyler, 1993; Galbraith, 1973), I hypothesize that global strategic posture, a measure of the
intensity of a firm’s involvement in the multinational business environment, moderates the
relationships between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance. My findings reveal an
“enhancing” interaction (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) between the different
TMT heterogeneities investigated and the corresponding firm performance measures.
Implications, limitations and future research directions are discussed.

Top Management Team, TMT Heterogeneity, Global Strategic Posture, Multinational Enterprise,
MNE Firm Performance
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TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM HETEROGENEITY,
GLOBAL STRATEGIC POSTURE, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE FROM MNES HEADQUARTERED AROUND THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION

Top Management Team (TMT) characteristics, according to prevailing views in the
strategic management domain, are organizational factors that affect strategic outcomes and firm
performance (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For many of
these studies, the measure of similarity, or more precisely dissimilarity, of these TMT member
characteristics is termed TMT heterogeneity. Upon investigating this heterogeneity concept and
associations with organizational outcomes, researchers have found mixed results (e.g. Goll,
Sambharya, & Tucci, 2001; Murray, 1989; Norburn & Birley, 1988; West & Schwenk, 1996).
Perhaps boundary conditions exist that shed light on or lend meaning to these findings to date.
Could the global involvement that firms have provide a moderating effect or a missing piece to
the boundary puzzle?
Top Management Team studies began to increase in number and significance with the
publication of a seminal article written by Hambrick and Mason (1984). In this conceptual work,
the authors proposed the upper echelons theory. This theoretical perspective asserts that top
managers interpret the strategic situations they face, and these interpretations are a function of
their past experiences, personalities, and values. Methodologically, the upper echelons
perspective provides a theoretical approach linking top managers’ attributes or characteristics to
organizational outcomes. These managerial characteristics may include factors such as
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organizational tenure, educational background, and functional orientation, which are then used to
calculate a TMT’s measure of heterogeneity.
In conjunction with this upper echelons perspective, could other factors be affecting and
moreover moderate the relationship between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance? TMTs
headquartered in countries throughout the world and operating in multinational environments
may provide insight into this question. These TMTs differ in heterogeneity characteristics, and
they also address differing degrees of highly diverse and complex business contexts (Carpenter
& Fredrickson, 2001). Thus, a goal of this study is to begin a dialogue involving the
characteristics of top managers, a firm’s global involvement, and organizational outcomes.
The use of the construct global strategic posture is one measure used to capture the
intensity of a firm’s involvement in the multinational business environment. It indicates the
global presence of a multinational enterprise (MNE). More specifically, global strategic posture
“reflects the degree to which a firm depends on foreign markets for customers and factors of
production and the geographical dispersion of the markets and factors” (Carpenter &
Fredrickson, 2001: 534).
The purpose and contributions of this study are to empirically investigate firm
performance from the perspective of top management teams based in countries around the world
managing multinational enterprises. This cross section of TMTs has received little attention in
the extant TMT and strategic management literature (Hambrick, 2007). More importantly,
however, this study will explore the moderating role of the MNE’s intensity or involvement in
the global environment on the main relationship between TMT heterogeneity and firm
performance.
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I first disentangle the broad heterogeneity concept to hypothesize main effects
relationships between specific TMT heterogeneity characteristics and firm outcomes. Higher
levels of organizational tenure heterogeneity are hypothesized to negatively affect firm
performance. Conversely, both higher levels of educational background heterogeneity and
functional orientation heterogeneity are hypothesized to positively affect firm performance.
To then explore new ground within the TMT and strategic management research
domains, I hypothesize that a firm’s global strategic posture moderates these main effect
relationships described above. Specifically, global strategic posture is hypothesized to
negatively moderate organizational tenure heterogeneity while the same construct is
hypothesized to positively moderate educational background heterogeneity and functional
orientation heterogeneity. These hypotheses are based on a theoretical rationale known as the
information processing perspective (Daft, Bettenhausen, & Tyler, 1993; Galbraith, 1973). The
hypothesized relationships are represented in Figure 1. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of
300 TMTs leading multinational firms and headquartered in 31 different countries across the
globe.
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GLOBAL STRATEGIC POSTURE:
Composite measure of:
- Foreign Sales to Total Sales
- Foreign-Owned Assets to Total Assets
- Geographic Diversity

( - ) Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
( + ) Educational Background Heterogeneity
( + ) Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

MNE TMT HETEROGENEITY:
•
•
•

Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity

FIRM PERFORMANCE:

(-)

Educational Background Heterogeneity ( + )
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

(+)

FIGURE 1
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•

Lagged ROA

•

Lagged ROS

•

Lagged ROE

•

Composite measure of
lagged ROA, ROS, and ROE

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Theoretical Perspectives of the TMT
Whether called dominant coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963), inner circles (Thompson,
1967), or top management teams (Bourgeois, 1980), these groups of company top-level
executives have been extensively investigated in the strategic management literature. Here
forward referred to as top management teams, or simply TMTs, these groups have sparked two
major and competing theoretical perspectives. The focus lies on the question of whether these
TMTs are believed to significantly impact organizational/firm outcomes.
One view, which arises out of the domain of population ecology (Hannan & Freeman,
1977) and new institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) views top managers as having
little effect on their organizations. The perspective posits that firms are “exceedingly inertial,
swept along by external forces, and constrained by a host of conventions and norms” (Hambrick,
2007: 335). External forces such as government intervention and regulation, economic
conditions, interest rate and currency fluctuations, industry type, and competition are perceived
as drivers of firm outcomes and not the decisions and intervention of the TMT (Webber &
Donahue, 2001). The TMTs influence remains tenuous; these top executives are indeed seen as
interchangeable in so much as their replacement will not significantly affect the direction and
performance of the firm.
The prevailing view from the strategic management domain, however, claims quite the
opposite. To researchers and practitioners alike, this “link between the people at the strategic
apex of the organization and that organization’s performance” is a subject of paramount
importance (Pitcher & Smith, 2001:1). It is this strategic leadership view (Finkelstein &
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Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick, 1989) that suggests that the top executives greatly influence the
strategies and outcomes of their firms. The seminal theoretical perspective and the impetus for a
great amount of research on TMTs was proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984). Their article
introduces the upper echelons theory.
The upper echelons theory proposes that top executives interpret their strategic situations,
and these interpretations are a function of their individual experiences, values, and personalities.
While most strategic management researchers have not directly measured the top executive’s
psychological and cognitive frame, often referred to as the “black box” (Lawrence, 1997: 2),
researchers have used demographic data to investigate these top managers. It is this data, which
includes characteristics such as organizational tenure, educational background, functional
orientation, and to a lesser extent characteristics such as age and sex, that have been tied to
organizational outcomes in an effort to ascertain if significant relationships exist. Thus, it has
also been these characteristics that have been used as valid, albeit noted as imprecise and
incomplete, proxies of the top executive’s psychological and cognitive frame. Collectively,
these characteristics have been described as “stocks” of organizational knowledge and embody a
certain level of the firm’s human capital at a point in time (Becker, 1964; Smith, Collins, &
Clark, 2005).
Important extensions or refinements of the upper echelons theory in the past two and a
half decades come from research into moderators proposed to influence the main heterogeneityfirm outcome relationship. Some of these moderators are posited to affect the theory’s predictive
strength and more importantly, some have also been posited to reconcile the two opposing
theoretical views. Two of the more significant moderators proposed include managerial
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discretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) and executive job demands (Hambrick, Finkelstein, &
Mooney, 2005).
The first, managerial discretion, addresses the TMT’s latitude of action. TMTs with
greater managerial discretion face less constraint and more ambiguity in their decision making
environment, and thus, multiple alternatives exist within their organizations. This presents an
opportunity in their executive decision making where they more heavily rely on their own
personal characteristics and background attributes to reach decisions; these factors are then
reflected in firm strategy and performance (Hambrick, 2007). Therefore, greater managerial
discretion implies that the predictive ability of upper echelons theory should be strengthened.
A second proposed moderator is termed executive job demands and takes into account
three managerial factors. The first factor, task challenges, addresses the difficulty of strategic
conditions. The second factor, performance challenges, includes consideration of difficult
situations created by demanding owners and/or boards of directors. Lastly, the third factor,
executive aspirations, acknowledges the top manager’s strong interpersonal desire to yield
optimal results, such as maximizing performance (Hambrick, 2007).
Higher levels of executive job demands, similar to managerial discretion, are proposed to
increase the predictive ability of upper echelons theory. The rationale is as follows. As
executive job demands increase, executives are forced to take mental shortcuts; these shortcuts
result in the executive relying on his or her personal characteristics and background. These
characteristics are then once again prominently reflected in firm strategies and performance
(Hambrick, 2007).
Thus, the upper echelons theory has evolved and been refined since its introduction in
1984. The central premise still remains, however, “if we want to explain why organizations do
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the things they do, or in turn, why they perform the way they do, we must examine the people at
the top” (Hambrick, 1989: 5). This simple but clear statement encapsulates the goal of TMT
research; it also extends research that only focuses on the CEO as the strategic decision maker
within the firm. It has been noted that leadership, especially in large and complex organizations,
is a shared responsibility (Hambrick, 2007). Top management teams are, therefore, perceived as
having a central responsibility for their various stakeholders and for the firm; they extend
influence on organizational culture, company policy, impending strategies, financial position,
and organizational-level outcomes, (Barrick, Bradley, Kristof-Brown, & Colbert, 2007; Mayer &
Gavin, 2005).

TMT Heterogeneity, Firm Performance, and Possible Moderation
The relationship between managerial characteristics and performance has provided
impetus for both researchers and practitioners to study team composition and configuration of
member attributes. Researchers have, therefore, operationalized TMT demographic diversity or
more precisely TMT heterogeneity in many different ways. This issue may in fact be reason as
to why different conclusions have been drawn and the findings mixed. Moreover, the
generalizability of these results is called into question because the samples investigated in these
empirical studies have most often only included U.S.-based firms (Hambrick, 2007).
In a study of Fortune 500 companies within the oil industry, a positive association was
found between TMT heterogeneity and long-term firm performance. Age, firm tenure, and TMT
tenure were used as measures of heterogeneity. In the same study, which also investigated the
food industry, no TMT heterogeneity-firm performance relationships were detected (Murray,
1989). In a study by Norburn and Birley (1988) on five different U.S. industries, characteristics
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such as functional orientation, tenure, and educational background were examined. The results
were both positively and negatively associated with firm performance depending upon the
particular type of heterogeneity and industry. Finally, more recently West and Schwenk (1996)
investigated stable and dynamic U.S. industries and were unable to detect any heterogeneity
relationships with firm performance, neither positive nor negative.
A meta-analysis was conducted concerning different types of diverse work groups and
their corresponding performance (Webber & Donahue, 2001). Where TMTs were concerned,
the researchers indicated that the performance variable most often investigated was firm-level
financial performance (i.e. return on investment, return on equity, return on assets, profitability
during the year, and/or sales increase). No relationships were uncovered. It was suggested by
the researchers that future studies both stop treating diversity as a “generic concept” (Webber &
Donahue, 2001: 159) as many studies in their sample had and that they also stop proposing
diversity of all types will have a positive relationship with performance.
In a more recent meta-analysis investigating twenty-seven empirical studies on the
relationship between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton,
2006), a positive and significant relationship was found between TMT functional heterogeneity
and ROA and also between TMT executive tenure heterogeneity and ROA. No significant
relationships were found for organizational tenure heterogeneity and ROA or between
educational heterogeneity and ROA. With respect to the other firm performance variables
investigated (three year averaged ROA, ROA growth, three year averaged ROE, and sales
growth), either there were no relevant empirical studies, less than three observations, or
insignificant findings for these other various firm performance measures.
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These findings are an invitation to continue this line of research and to employ several
different measures of TMT heterogeneity and firm performance in order to unmask the
significant relationships within these inconsistent findings. These past studies call on researchers
to investigate firms operating in the global business environment in order to find generalizable
relationships across differing business conditions. Furthermore, the TMT-firm performance
meta-analysis by Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton (2006) draws attention to the possibility of
moderators acting upon the heterogeneity-firm performance relationship; moderators may shed
light on the inconsistent findings to date.
Thus, for purposes of my research, TMT heterogeneity and firm performance will be
explicitly measured in several different ways. Specifically with heterogeneity, it is
presumptuous to believe one large measure of dispersion can be calculated to encompass several
types of characteristics. These different characteristics may indeed be acting opposite to one
another or have no individually significant effect on firm performance. Hypotheses, therefore,
will be developed for specific and relevant types of TMT heterogeneity. Moreover, these
relevant types of heterogeneity will be tested with several different dependent variable measures
of firm performance.
It should be noted that the constructs used to develop the main effect hypotheses herein
have been previously tested in the extant literature. However, this study’s uncommon and widereaching sample provides a secondary-level contribution. Multinational enterprises
headquartered and operating in different countries spread across the world is far from the norm
for Top Management Team studies (Hambrick, 2007). A recent Academy of Management
Journal editorial (Eden, 2002) also persuasively reaffirms the importance of these replication
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studies; in particular, the use of different measures and samples was emphasized in order to
advance theory.
This study, therefore, is more correctly likened to that of constructive replication
(Lykken, 1968). My study tests hypothesized relationships among the same theoretical
constructs as previous work; however, the operationalization of these constructs varies. The
validity of the hypothesized associations is then strengthened by the confirmation of these same
hypotheses using different methods.
Most importantly, however, to make my primary-level research contribution and
ultimately extend the theoretical domain of this study beyond constructive replication, the TMT
heterogeneity-firm performance relationship will also be investigated from a moderating
perspective. This moderating influence will be hypothesized on the main effects relationships
developed herein. Exploring the possibility of a moderating relationship, however, cannot take
place without first developing and testing hypotheses concerning the direct relationships. I will,
therefore, first examine the main effects relationships and then proceed to the exploration of
possible moderation.

Heterogeneity and the TMT
This dialogue is continued by more closely examining the functional and dysfunctional
outcomes of TMT heterogeneity. On the more advantageous end, diverse or heterogeneous
TMTs in general should alleviate team issues such as groupthink (Hambrick & Mason, 1984);
groupthink is the phenomenon in which the norm for consensus overrides the realistic appraisal
of alternative courses of action (Janus, 1982). Heterogeneity is further posited to provide TMTs
with greater cognitive resources, wider peer networks, multiple perspectives, greater levels of
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information, and higher quality solutions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Certo, Lester, Dalton, &
Dalton, 2006; Webber & Donahue, 2001; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998).
A more balanced perspective, however, occurs while peering into the “black box”
(Lawrence, 1997: 2) between executive demographics and organizational outcomes, where
researchers propose that one of the key process variables affecting the heterogeneity-firm
performance relationship is conflict. Depending upon the type of conflict the TMT engages in,
advantageous or disadvantageous results may occur. Different conclusions, therefore, may then
be drawn.
From one perspective, cognitive conflict, also similarly known as task conflict, process
conflict and functional conflict, aids the TMT as team members disagree about their ideas and
issues such as the content of work, key decisions, the goals of work, procedures on how work
gets completed, and choices for action (Amason, 1996; Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). It is
this kind of conflict that scholars agree generates improved decisions (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin,
1999).
Another type of conflict, however, known as interpersonal conflict, also relatedly termed
relationship conflict (Simons & Peterson, 2000), emotional conflict (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin,
1999), or affective/dysfunctional conflict (Amason, 1996), is evident in interpersonal hostilities
and personality clashes within the group. It is this type of conflict that is considered to decrease
cohesion and hinder the TMT as heterogeneity increases (Knight et al., 1999; Webber &
Donahue, 2001).
Moreover, and in line with interpersonal conflict, another important issue to consider as
group heterogeneity increases is categorization (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). This
phenomenon is the “subconscious tendency of individuals to sort each other into social
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categories. [...] Individuals tend to think positively of their own categories and more negatively
about other categories” (Certo et al., 2006: 818). Categorization ultimately results in
interpersonal conflict (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999) as group members make inferences
regarding other team members’ attributes (Webber & Donahue, 2001).
In summary, researchers have noted that an increase in interpersonal conflict is often a
result of issues such as categorization as well as other critical group issues to include informal
communication, social integration, and behavioral integration (Hambrick 1998; Hambrick, 1994;
Smith et al., 1994; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Categorization, previously described, becomes
a disadvantage to more heterogeneous teams. Team heterogeneity also does not facilitate the
ease and frequent exchange of informal communication (Smith et al., 1994), which is vital for
efficient team coordination (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). Finally, social and behavioral
integration address similar but distinct concepts concerning group cohesion and collective and
effective group interaction; these issues in lower levels are proposed to be associated to higher
levels of interpersonal conflict (Knight et al., 1999; Webber & Donahue, 2001).
Thus, TMT heterogeneity and TMT homogeneity both have their benefits and
hindrances. These issues will be more closely explored and hypotheses subsequently developed.
One caveat is more fully expounded upon, however, before this action is taken; it is that of
Lawrence’s (1997) concern with the black box of organizational demography.
In using demographic predictors to explain outcomes, I broach the issue of using
imprecise proxies, as researchers have also done in past studies, in an attempt to measure the
executive’s psychological and cognitive frame. As I use process concepts such as conflict to
develop my arguments for hypotheses development herein, this concern is appropriately noted.
It is also, however, noted that this type of research is still beneficial. In an update on nearly
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twenty-five years of upper echelons research, Hambrick (2007: 337) states that actually
performing black box research is extremely difficult; “it requires very intrusive access to large
numbers of executives and TMTs, who are notoriously unwilling to submit themselves to
scholarly poking and probing.” Furthermore, it requires researchers that have “an interest in and
facility with both microprocesses and macro-organizational phenomena” (Hambrick, 2007: 337).
Therefore, this issue is recognized as a limitation of the present study. It is also recognized,
however, as an avenue for future research as well when important findings are made. In
summary, it should be noted that both macro and micro types of research studies are, therefore,
required moving forward to unravel the enigma of top management teams.
I now continue by more closely examining three critically relevant types of TMT
heterogeneity strongly associated to the psychological and cognitive processes of the TMT:
organizational tenure, educational background, and functional orientation (Olson, Parayitam, &
Bao, 2007). While any attribute of TMT heterogeneity may have relevance for organizational
outcomes, I focus primarily on these three because they are also highly job related and thus more
salient to the strategic and operational tasks facing TMTs than other aspects of heterogeneity
such as race, gender, and age, for example, which are lower in job relatedness (Pelled,
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).

Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
A critical TMT heterogeneity characteristic is tenure, the period of time during which an
employee’s position has been held. In the Top Management Team literature, the concept of
tenure has been investigated as tenure within the TMT, tenure within the executive ranks, and
tenure within the organization. Capturing tenure within the organization, however, provides
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much greater opportunity for an employee to acclimate to a firm’s culture; this process more
profoundly shapes the views and ultimately the decisions of a firm’s managers. Interestingly
enough, however, it is also this acculturation that may constrict an employee’s perspectives
(Harrison & Carroll, 1991; Robbins, 2005).
Studies have shown that associations among team heterogeneity and performance depend
upon the type of work the team performs (Bell, 2007). Using Devine’s (2002) team type
taxonomy, teams are grouped into two overarching dimensions, physical teams (e.g. production,
service) and intellectual teams (e.g. advisory, executive). TMTs are categorized as the latter,
intellectual teams, where thinking is principle and fundamental to the task. These intellectual
teams utilize nonlinear work processes and mental skills; their primary result is new knowledge
and information (Bell, 2007).
As these teams use their skills of thinking and reasoning, however, organizational culture,
norms and routines are imprinted on this process. Knowledge, more specifically tacit
knowledge, which is personal know-how difficult to confirm and convey, guides the
development and use of these company norms and routines (Smith, Collins, & Clark, 2005). As
acculturation takes place for employees with longer organizational tenures, the cognitive
diversity/heterogeneity of the group is impacted. In essence, longer tenures lead to cognitive
homogenization (Harrison & Carroll, 1991; Robbins, 2005).
Similarly, longer organizational tenures among the top management team members also
lead to an issue characterized as becoming stale in the saddle (Miller, 1991). This concept,
described by research performed by Miller (1991) through the investigation of longer tenured
CEOs, captures an executive’s desire to resist external pressures for change due to issues such as
the gaining over time of a controlling balance of power, entrenchment in the ideology of the
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firm, and the surrounding of themselves with other executives that have views very similar to
their own. This also homogenizes the TMT and the organization (Miller, 1991). This
homogeneity of the team, furthermore, leads to other issues such as groupthink (Janus, 1982), a
team disadvantage previously described.
In contrast to TMT members with longer organizational tenures, TMT members with less
organizational tenure are characterized as more willing to challenge the status quo. Issues
associated with TMTs becoming stale in the saddle are posited to be countered (Simons, Pelled,
& Smith, 1999). But the question truly becomes, are they?
It is posited that the issue of categorization between the longer tenured and shorter
tenured executives takes its negative toll on group processes. This form of heterogeneity more
strikingly separates team members into one of two groups, those with longer tenures versus those
with shorter tenures. In this respect, this particular heterogeneity measure is methodologically
different than heterogeneity measures such as educational background and functional orientation,
which will be subsequently addressed and have more classifications and possible subgroups that
may be encountered.
Thus, it is this process of categorization that leads to relationship/dysfunctional conflict
and ultimately and negatively impacts team processes, decisions, and outcomes. Since the
heterogeneity of TMT firm tenure connotes that some TMT members will have spent more time
with the organization while others are fairly new to the organization, the increase in group
organizational tenure heterogeneity in essence has divisive ramifications leading to the
disadvantageous issues described herein.
This dysfunctional conflict is responsible for the hindrance of team cohesion and group
performance. Ultimately, poorer TMT decisions and negative firm performance will be
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manifested via the increased organizational tenure heterogeneity of the top executives. This
perspective also falls in line with insight gained from the team-performance meta-analysis
performed by Webber and Donahue (2001), which suggests that researchers stop proposing that
diversity of all types naively and simply have a positive relationship with performance. Thus,
due to the arguments provided, I hypothesize a negative association between organizational
tenure heterogeneity and firm performance. Stated in hypothesis form:

H1:

Greater TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity is negatively associated with
Firm Performance.

Figure 2 provides graphical representation of this hypothesis along with other pertinent statistical
details.
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Firm
Performance

TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity
H1:

Greater TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity is negatively
associated with Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b0,
where b1 is (-)

FIGURE 2
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Educational Background Heterogeneity
Contrary to the hypothesis developed for organizational tenure, greater heterogeneity for
certain types of characteristics should be more advantageous for group processes and will,
therefore, positively influence the group and ultimately, firm performance (Webber & Donahue,
2001). Proposed as a highly critical group characteristic, educational background has been
described as notably relevant to cognitive work tasks. It is proposed to have “a stronger impact
on the task-relevant group processes and performance” (Webber & Donahue, 2001: 143) than
most other characteristics. Moreover, conflict related to the team’s tasks and processes has
already been described to lead to improved decision-making (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).
Regarding teams and their members’ educational backgrounds, psychologists further
support the associations between the level and breadth of education with improved knowledge
structures, information processing, and cognitive performance (Glaser, 1984; Smith, Collins, &
Clark, 2005). In accordance with upper echelons theory and because this study specifically
examines top executives, this connection extends to the TMT’s improved outcome organizational performance.
Level and breadth of education also tie to another important psychological construct,
general mental ability (GMA). Recalling Devine’s (2002) team type taxonomy, TMTs are
characterized as intellectual teams and charged with creating new knowledge (Bell, 2007).
GMA has been found to be more highly associated with intellectual teams rather than physical
teams, and in two recent meta-analyses, GMA has surfaced as a strong predictor of performance
(Devine & Phillips, 2001; Stewart, 2006). Finally, researchers have posited that more highly and
broadly educated executive teams would have greater cognitive abilities and have the ability to
generate more novel and creative firm solutions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Thus, consistent with
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previous TMT literature, I hypothesize a positive association between educational background
heterogeneity and firm performance. Stated in hypothesis form:

H2:

Greater TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity is positively associated with
Firm Performance.

Figure 3 provides graphical representation of this hypothesis along with other pertinent statistical
details.
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Firm
Performance

TMT Educational
Background Heterogeneity
H2:

Greater TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity is positively
associated with Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT educational background heterogeneity

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b0,
where b1 is (+)

FIGURE 3
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Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
A third relevant TMT characteristic that has been posited to have a prominent effect on
firm performance is functional orientation; this particular form of team diversity has been cited
as the most frequently studied aspect of TMT heterogeneity (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008;
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). This type of
heterogeneity distinguishes executives by their primary occupational profession, such as
marketing, operations, finance, counsel, etc. (Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996). Thus, noted as a
critical heterogeneity measure (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), it is posited to influence how
managers perceive and define business problems (Hambrick, 1989).
This heterogeneity attribute is highly relevant to cognitive work tasks and posited to also
be significantly associated to task-relevant group processes and performance (Webber &
Donahue, 2001). Executives from different functional backgrounds inject their individual
perspectives from working in different types of arenas and the tendency towards groupthink is
avoided (Certo et al., 2006). Moreover, this type of heterogeneity ties to the effective utilization
of functional conflict, productive knowledge exchanges, and wider perspectives (Smith, Collins,
& Clark, 2005).
Thus, in line with the more general consensus of functional orientation heterogeneity
studies that have posited positive, linear relationships with firm performance, I too hypothesize a
positive relationship between functional orientation heterogeneity and firm performance. Stated
in hypothesis form:

H3:

Greater TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity is positively associated with
Firm Performance.
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Figure 4 provides graphical representation of this hypothesis along with other pertinent statistical
details.
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Firm
Performance

TMT Functional
Orientation Heterogeneity
H3:

Greater TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity is positively
associated with Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT functional orientation heterogeneity

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b0,
where b1 is (+)

FIGURE 4
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TMTs and the International Context
One of the main concerns to date with TMT research in the strategic management domain
is the issue that most of the findings and conclusions have been drawn from studies of U.S.based organizations. In a recent review on the state of the field, one of the most prolific and
impactful TMT researchers stated, “The overwhelming majority of empirical upper echelons
studies have used samples of American firms” (Hambrick, 2007: 339). In order to extend the
theoretical perspective on this subject, researchers must examine TMTs and firms operating in
the international context or as Hambrick describes, the “macrosocial context” (Hambrick, 2007:
339); this effort will allow researchers to determine if upper echelons theory takes on a different
representation.
To further substantiate the need for research extension into the international domain, in a
review of 222 articles published in leading strategic management and international business
journals from 1986 through 1995, Lohrke and Burton (1997:41) noted that TMT research is
“notably absent” from the international strategic management literature. Athanassiou and Nigh
(1999), moreover, determined that studies concerning TMTs in multinationals are extremely rare.
I plan to address these two concerns simultaneously by not only investigating TMTs
based/headquartered in different countries across the globe, but more specifically, by
investigating TMTs based in different countries around the world that are engaged in managing
MNEs - multinational enterprises.
It should be noted that there are a handful of studies that do investigate TMTs in the
international context; however, while these investigations do examine multinational firms, they
are still U.S.-based firm studies. For example, Sambharya (1996) tests the association between
international experience of U.S.-based multinational top management teams and international
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diversifications strategies. Athanassiou and Nigh (2000; 1999) examine U.S.-based MNE TMTs
and internationalization. The fate of top executives in U.S.-based multinational firms following
a merger or acquisition is investigated by Krug and Hegarty (2001). More recently, Carpenter
and Sanders (2004a) investigate the associations between TMT compensation, the firm’s degree
of internationalization, and U.S.-based MNE performance. These studies begin to address
important organizational behavior and strategic management issues. More importantly, however,
they extend upper echelons theory into the international business (IB) arena.

TMTs and the Global Business Environment
By incorporating the study of the characteristics of top managers along with the business
environment’s seemingly ubiquitous call to globalize the firm (Levy, 2005), the TMT managing
the multinational enterprise provides a unique and promising context to test and extend the
theoretical perspective of upper echelons. I have theoretically explored the characteristics of the
TMT and accordingly developed hypotheses concerning relevant heterogeneity attributes with
respect to firm performance. I will now turn my attention to examining the significance of the
MNE and the global business environment.
Before advancing onward, however, another theoretical perspective needs to be
introduced, addressed and considered in this dialogue. This similarly important theory, most
notably for top management team studies, is termed the information processing perspective
(Daft, Bettenhausen, & Tyler, 1993; Galbraith, 1973). According to this perspective,
“organizations are information processing systems, and strategic decisions require information
processing by the managers” (Olson, Parayitnam, & Bao, 2007: 198). The theory is used by
TMT researchers (e.g. Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) to
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suggest that one of the chief duties of executive managers is to process information; then
relatedly, the effective execution of this responsibility, posited through the use of team
heterogeneity, is associated with increased firm performance (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996).
This relationship is another, albeit not completely unrelated, rationale for investigating the
associations between TMT demographic variables, team heterogeneity, and organizational
outcomes (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). This theoretical perspective also becomes
more pronounced with the examination of TMTs managing in the global business environment
as previous literature further suggests that the top management team does play an important role
in determining the success of the multinational enterprise and does influences MNE performance
(Goll, Sambharya, & Tucci, 2001; Li, Xin, Tsui, & Hambrick, 1999; Murray, 1989; Norburn &
Birley, 1988; Schuler, 2001).
MNEs are described as firms that operate in several countries (Deresky, 1997; Stopford,
1992). For TMTs engaged in making strategic decisions for the MNE, operating in this type of
business environment introduces high levels of uncertainty and dissimilarity (Caloria, Johnson,
& Sarnin, 1994; Prahalad & Doz, 1987). These conditions give rise to what social psychologists
term weak situations (Mischel, 1977), where top managers are characterized as having more
decision making discretion. Thus, the individual characteristics of the top executives are most
likely to dominate group and organizational norms (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Finkelstein
& Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987).
The concept of decision making discretion is very similar to and closely aligned with the
concepts of managerial discretion and executive job demands (specifically task challenges)
previously discussed. These concepts are posited to moderate and possibly even reconcile the
theoretical perspectives on TMTs and organizational outcomes (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987;
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Hambrick, Finkelstein, & Mooney, 2005). At higher levels of decision-making and managerial
discretion and task challenges, like those found in the MNE context, managerial predispositions
and personal characteristics are more pronounced in influencing strategy and performance.
Stated in yet another way, TMT characteristics are prominently reflected in firm strategies and
performance; the influence of leadership is magnified. This, in essence, increases the predictive
ability of upper echelons theory in the MNE environment (Hambrick, 2007).
MNEs also present a context where organizations are more complex. This greater
complexity is associated with increased information processing requirements for the top
executive team (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). Since the task of information processing
represents one of the primary responsibilities of the TMT, the realization and execution of this
duty is paramount to organizational functioning and firm performance (Henderson &
Fredrickson, 1996). As the environment becomes more complex, more unstable, and more
uncertain, the perceived risk of organizational failure is also greater (Hambrick & Finkelstein,
1987). These environmental conditions can impact the relationships between executive
characteristics and organizational performance (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) and are,
therefore, posited to moderate the main heterogeneity-performance relationship.
The realization as described by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996: 20) is that under
conditions of greater uncertainty, top managers are “embedded in ambiguity, complexity, and
information overload.” Indeed, the global context appears to affect the TMT and thus, ultimately
firm outcomes as well. While the global economy has “created an increasingly complex
decision-making environment characterized by information overabundance, uncertainty, and
ambiguity,” (Levy, 2005: 797) the TMTs still only have limited information processing capacity
as they pay attention to a finite number of issues, interpret them, and take subsequent action
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(Levy, 2005). Therefore, as firms continue to expand their global presence, it is hypothesized
that due to the information processing theoretical perspective, this expansion will have an
interacting effect on the main relationship between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance.
Will this interacting effect, however, be positive or negative?
The information processing perspective proposes that diverse team characteristics
facilitate the heterogeneity-firm performance relationship. In essence, this theory posits that
increased information processing has a magnification effect on the main relationships. The
perspective further advances the idea that not only information processing but information
overload as well, will ultimately moderate team heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus, the
gaps that exist in the scholarly understanding of TMTs and organizational outcomes invites
exploration of this possible moderator and potential boundary condition.

Global Strategic Posture
By introducing a construct known as global strategic posture, I will address this argument
more methodologically. Global strategic posture indicates the level to which an organization
relies on foreign markets for “customers and factors of production and the geographical
dispersion of these markets and factors” (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001: 534).
Even though the complexity of taking a firm global is inherent in the globalization literature,
practitioners and researchers alike still continue to support the notion that companies must have a
strong global presence in order to achieve long-term success and survival (Barkema &
Vermeulen, 1998; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Levy, 2005).
While all MNEs in this study by definition have a multinational perspective because they
operate in at least three different countries, I am proposing that increasing global
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involvement/intensity and consequently increasing TMT information processing requirements
will magnify the already hypothesized heterogeneity-performance relationships. The
disadvantages or advantages gained from the specific types of heterogeneity-performance
relationships will be enhanced. Thus, with respect to organizational tenure heterogeneity, global
strategic posture will negatively moderate the proposed direct relationship. Conversely, with
respect to both educational background heterogeneity and functional orientation heterogeneity,
global strategic posture will positively moderate the hypothesized main relationships. In this
way, global strategic posture, which is a measure of the intensity of involvement in the external
environment, is hypothesized to magnify or enhance the relationships already developed herein.
To further clarify and highlight the importance of moderation, Cohen, Cohen, West, and
Aiken (2003: 285-286) describe three patterns of interactions between two continuous variables.
The first, an “enhancing” interaction, describes a situation where the predictor and moderator
variables affect the outcome variable in the same direction; their combined effect is stronger than
either individual effect. The second pattern, a “buffering” interaction, describes a situation
where the moderator variable weakens the effect of the predictor variable on the outcome.
Finally, the third pattern termed an “antagonistic” interaction, describes the scenario in which the
predictor and moderator variables have the same effect on the outcome, but the interaction is in
the opposite direction.
With respect to all three hypotheses, I am proposing an “enhancing” interaction (Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286). In other words, where organizational tenure is predicted
to have a negative and linear effect on firm performance due to the issues of interpersonal
conflict and more specifically categorization, a lack of team cohesion, poor informal
communication and ineffective team integration, information overload due to the multinational
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business context will only magnify these problematic issues and ultimately firm performance.
On the other hand, where TMT educational background and TMT functional orientation are
posited to have positive and linear effects on firm performance, effective and efficient
information processing in the multinational business environment will enhance the firm
outcomes hypothesized. These teams are posited to have the ability to increase absorption and
recall of complex issues during decision making, increase cognitive conflict via more distinct
individual judgments to address decision making errors, and increase the quantity and quality of
potential resolutions in the problem-solving process (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). This
suggests the following hypotheses:

H4:

Global Strategic Posture negatively moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity and Firm
Performance.

H5:

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity and Firm
Performance.

H6:

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity and Firm
Performance.
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Figures 5, 6, and 7 provide graphical representation of these hypotheses along with other
pertinent statistical details.
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Firm
Performance

Low Global
Strategic Posture

High Global
Strategic Posture

Low
(mean - 1 sd)
H4:

TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity

High
(mean + 1 sd)

Global Strategic Posture negatively moderates the previously proposed
linear relationship between TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
and Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity

Moderator:

global strategic posture

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b2Z + b3XZ + b0,
where b1 is (-), b2 is (-), b3 is (-)
FIGURE 5
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Firm
Performance

High Global
Strategic Posture

Low Global
Strategic Posture

Low
(mean - 1 sd)
H5:

TMT Educational
Background Heterogeneity

High
(mean + 1 sd)

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed
linear relationship between TMT Educational Background
Heterogeneity and Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT educational background heterogeneity

Moderator:

global strategic posture

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b2Z + b3XZ + b0,
where b1 is (+), b2 is (+), b3 is (+)
FIGURE 6
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Firm
Performance
High Global
Strategic Posture

Low Global
Strategic Posture

Low
(mean - 1 sd)
H6:

TMT Functional
Orientation Heterogeneity

High
(mean + 1 sd)

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed
linear relationship between TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
and Firm Performance.

Variable Operationalization: (details/references listed in variable table)
Sample description and TMT definition
DV:

firm performance

IV:

TMT functional orientation heterogeneity

Moderator:

global strategic posture

Controls:

firm size, firm age, TMT size, primary industry
type

Method:

hierarchical OLS regression
Y = b1X + b2X2 + b3Z + b4XZ + b5X2Z + b0,
where b1 is (+), b2 is (+), b3 is (+)
FIGURE 7
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METHODS

I have tested my hypotheses using established measures from the extant literature on a
sample of 300 top management teams (TMTs) managing multinational enterprises (MNEs). A
total of 3,392 executives from MNEs headquartered in 31 different countries were investigated.
I used hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis to test the six hypotheses;
this also allowed for the inclusion of relevant control variables.

Sample and Measures
Information about TMTs headquartered in countries across the globe that are managing
MNEs was obtained from Capital IQ. Capital IQ is a database that provides global market and
financial data on privately and publicly held firms. It is operated via a division of Standard and
Poor’s.
I used Deresky’s (1997: 190) characterization of the MNE as “a company that engages in
production or service activities through its own affiliates in several countries, maintains control
over the policies of those affiliates, and manages from a global perspective” to guide me as I read
through the database’s company-provided descriptions. I also reviewed the organizational
structure/company tree provided in the firm profile that detailed operations and subsidiary
activity. Specifically for purposes of this study, I included firms in the sample that fit Deresky’s
description while also meeting Stopford’s (1992) criterion that a firm is characterized as a
multinational if it has sales or production in at least three countries.
Via random sampling of organizations meeting the multinational enterprise criteria
described, the resulting 300 firms ranged in annual sales from $0.8 million to $179.1 billion
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(U.S.). Specific data for the independent variables and control variables were obtained for fiscal
year 2006 while each dependent variable was lagged one year to 2007. The firm performance
variables, therefore, incorporate a lagged component as previous TMT studies have also
previously done (Carpenter & Sanders, 2004a; Collins & Clark, 2003; Goll, Sambharya, &
Tucci, 2001; Michel & Hambrick, 1992). Table 1 provides further sample detail to include firm
primary industry participation (service-oriented versus manufacturing-oriented) and detail as to
which countries the MNEs are headquartered in via a firm count of specific countries found in
the sample.
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1
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3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

TABLE 1
Breakdown of MNE Detail
Represented in the Sample
MNE Home
Firm Count
Primary Industry:
Manufacturing
Service-Providing
Country
by Country
Australia
23
13
10
Austria
1
0
1
Belgium
1
1
0
Canada
15
7
8
China
2
1
1
China (Hong Kong)
15
9
6
China (Taiwan)
3
0
3
Finland
4
4
0
France
11
7
4
Germany
8
6
2
Greece
2
2
0
India
7
3
4
Ireland
3
1
2
Italy
2
1
1
Japan
28
17
11
Luxembourg
4
1
3
Malaysia
1
0
1
Netherlands
8
2
6
Norway
3
2
1
Philippines
3
2
1
Portugal
2
0
2
Russia
1
0
1
Singapore
16
7
9
Slovenia
1
0
1
South Korea
1
1
0
Spain
2
0
2
Sweden
6
2
4
Switzerland
9
5
4
Thailand
1
0
1
United Kingdom
32
10
22
United States
85
45
40
n =
300
149
151
Total number of TMT executives = 3,392
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The TMT has been operationalized using several different methods in past research.
Where possible, some researchers have asked the CEO directly to identify members of his or her
top team (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989). Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven
(1996) defined the TMT as the chief executive officer and those employees who directly report
to this individual. This method included executives such as those responsible for sales,
manufacturing, finance, and engineering.
A recent meta-analysis on TMTs suggests adopting a definition that is more salient
throughout the literature; they have proposed that the TMT include the top executives and the
next highest tier (Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). As in Hambrick’s (1994) study, this
definition captures the CEO and all officers above the level of vice president (i.e. the CFO,
presidents, executive vice presidents, and senior vice presidents). This operationalization of the
TMT has been shown to “provide a nice balance between being inclusive without being overinclusive” (Certo, et al., 2006: 830). It yields a fairly complete group of executives while still
providing parsimony (Chaganti & Sambharya, 1987; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Murray, 1989;
Wagner, Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984). Therefore, this is the definition that is used for this study;
the resulting mean TMT size was found to be 11.31.
Dependent Variable. Firm performance, the dependent variable is operationalized using
four different methods. This is done to substantiate the robustness of the hypothesized
relationships across variations in measurement; this is one of the benefits of constructive
replication as described by Eden (2002). Following previous TMT studies, these performance
measures incorporate a lag from the independent variables and control variables (Carpenter &
Sanders, 2004a; Collins & Clark, 2003; Goll, Sambharya, & Tucci, 2001; Michel & Hambrick,
1992). Firm performance is, therefore, measured as: 1) the lagged one year value of ROS (return
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on sales), 2) the lagged one year value of ROA (return on assets), 3) the lagged one year value of
ROE (return on equity), and 4) a composite measure of these lagged values of ROS, ROA, and
ROE (Agle et al., 2006). The composite measure is a variation of Haleblian and Finkelstein’s
(1993) measure; the three individual measures (ROS, ROA, and ROE) were standardized
(mean=0, s.d.=1) and then averaged by firm to generate the composite measure.
Independent Variables. Four independent variables are investigated in this study. They
are TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity, TMT educational background heterogeneity, TMT
functional orientation heterogeneity, and global strategic posture. The first three measures,
measures of executive team heterogeneity, are often used in upper echelon studies because, as
previously mentioned, researchers argue that these characteristics are strongly associated to the
psychological and cognitive processes of the TMT (Olson, Parayitam, & Bao, 2007). The
posited moderating effect of global strategic posture is then subsequently investigated.
Moreover, as recommended by Aiken and West (1991), these four independent and interacting
variables were centered to minimize issues caused by high levels of multicollinearity.
As in TMT research by Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001), values of TMT organizational
tenure heterogeneity are determined for each MNE by calculating the coefficient of variation
(standard deviation divided by the mean) of the TMT’s firm tenure. This operationalization is
preferable to using the standard deviation when interval-level data such as time or age are used
(Allison, 1978).
The next measure, TMT educational background heterogeneity, requires that TMT
members first be classified into one of eight categories, as was previously done in research by
Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996). The eight categories are listed in Table 2. The heterogeneity
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value is then calculated for each MNE using a variation of the Herfindal-Hirschman index. The
value is calculated using the following equation,
8

H = 1 – Σ (p i )2,
i=1

where H is the index concentration score and p is the percentage of top executives classified in
each of the eight educational background categories. Higher values of H indicate greater TMT
educational background heterogeneity.
The last heterogeneity measure, TMT functional orientation heterogeneity, is calculated
by first classifying each of the TMT members into one of sixteen categories, as was also
previously done in the study by Hambrick, Cho, and Chen (1996). The sixteen functional
orientation categories are listed in Table 2 along with the educational background categories.
The heterogeneity value is then calculated for each MNE using a variation of the HerfindalHirschman index once again. This value is calculated using the following equation,
16

H = 1 – Σ (p i )2,
i=1

where H for this measure represents the index concentration score and p is the percentage of
TMT members classified in each of the sixteen functional orientation categories. Higher values
of H indicate greater TMT functional orientation heterogeneity.
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TABLE 2
Coding Categories for TMT Members’ Background
Educational Background:
1. Engineering
2. Science
3. Business Administration
4. Economics
5. Liberal Arts
6. Law (LL.B. / J.D.)
7. Business (other than administration, e.g., accounting, finance)
8. Other
Functional Orientation:
1. CEO (Chief Executive Officer)

9.

2. COO (Chief Operations Officer)

10. Information Systems

3. Finance/Treasurer

11. International

4. Planning

12. Maintenance/Field Service

5. Personnel

13. General Management

6. Public Affairs

14. Other Corporate Staff

7. General Counsel/Secretary

15. Accounting/Controller

8. Operations/Field Service

16. Other
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Marketing/Sales/Customer Service

Finally, the global strategic posture variable is a composite measure of three dimensions:
1) foreign sales, 2) foreign production, and 3) geographic diversity (Carpenter & Fredrickson,
2001). “The first two dimensions, sales and assets, address a firm’s dependence on foreign
markets and foreign-placed resources (Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1993), respectively. The third
dimension indicates the geographic and cultural variety associated with the other two”
(Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001: 538).
The first dimension, foreign sales, is determined by calculating the percentage of foreign
sales revenue to total sales revenue. Similarly, the second dimension, foreign production, is
determined by calculating the percentage of foreign-owned assets to total assets. Lastly, the third
dimension, geographic diversity, assesses the extent to which a firm has “subsidiaries in any of
the ten cultural zones of the world identified by Ronen and Shenkar (1985)” (Carpenter &
Fredrickson, 2001: 538). A subsidiary or subsidiaries in one zone represents a score of 0.10.
Therefore, if a firm is present in five zones, the MNE totals a geographic diversity score of 0.50.
The values of the three dimensions are then summed to generate the overall composite
score, which is termed global strategic posture. The range can, therefore, extend from 0.0 to 3.0.
A greater overall composite score indicates a more expansive globalization posture for the
particular firm.
Control Variables. The extant literature has introduced many variables that help to
explain firm performance. And while it is not possible to include them all, those selected to be
used in this study are highly relevant to strategic management and TMT research; they control
for performance at multiple levels of analysis. The variables captured are firm size, firm age,
TMT size, and primary industry participation (Agle et al., 2006; Michel & Hambrick, 1992;
Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999; Smith et al., 1994; Thomas, 2006).
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Firm size was calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of firm employees
reported by the MNE (Smith et al., 1994). The transformation is used to reduce the skewness of
the size distribution and to achieve normality and homoskedasticity assumptions of ordinary least
squares regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Firm age was assessed as the number of years
the company has been in existence through 2006 (Michel & Hambrick, 1992), a self-reported
figure provided by the MNE. TMT size was calculated as the number of executives in the top
management team per the stated TMT definition provided herein (Simons, Pelled, & Smith,
1999). Finally, primary industry participation is controlled for by including a dummy variable
for firms primarily oriented towards and operating within the manufacturing industry, coded as
0, versus those primarily oriented towards and operating within the service-providing industry,
coded as 1 (Thomas, 2006). This information was captured using the MNEs primary industry
classification code identified in the Capital IQ database. All variables described for use in this
study are listed in Table 3 along with their operationalizations, references and data sources.
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TABLE 3
Variable Operationalization
Sample and TMT definition:
Variable

Operationalization

Reference / Data Source

General Sample Description

The sample is comprised of
multinational enterprises
(MNEs) headquartered in
most major regions of the
world to include: 1) Asia, 2)
Europe, and 3) North
America.

(Deresky, 1997; Stopford,
1972) / Capital IQ

the Top Management Team

The TMT is defined as all firm
executives above the level of
vice-president (e.g. CEO,
CFO, COO, Presidents, and
next highest tier of executives
such as Executive VPs and
Senior VPs).

(Chaganti & Sambharya,
1987; Michel & Hambrick,
1992; Murray, 1989; Wagner,
Pfeffer, & O’Reilly, 1984;
Certo, Lester, Dalton, Dalton,
2006) / Capital IQ

Variable

Operationalization

Reference / Data Source

Firm Performance

return on sales (ROS) - lagged
1 yr from IVs and controls

(Agle et al., 2006) / Capital IQ

return on assets (ROA) lagged 1 yr from IVs and
controls

(Agle et al., 2006) / Capital IQ

return on equity (ROE) lagged 1 yr from IVs and
controls

(Agle et al., 2006) / Capital IQ

Dependent Variable:

composite measure of ROS,
ROA, and ROE - lagged 1 yr
from IVs and controls
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(Haleblian & Finkelstein,
1993) / Capital IQ

TABLE 3 (continued)
Independent Variables:
Variable

Operationalization

TMT Educational Background TMT members are first
Heterogeneity
classified by highest
educational degree obtained to
1 of 8 coding categories
(reference Table 2). Then, a
variation of the HerfindahlHirschman Index is calculated
to determine the degree of
heterogeneity, where H is the
index concentration score and
p is the percentage of
executives classified in each
of the 8 educational
classifications. H = 1 - Σ (p i )2,
where i = 1-8

Reference / Data Source
(Hambrick, Cho, & Chen,
1996) / Capital IQ

TMT Organizational Tenure
Heterogeneity

The variable is measured by
calculating the coefficient of
variation of the TMT's firm
tenure (standard deviation
divided by the mean).

(Carpenter & Fredrickson,
2001) / Capital IQ

TMT Functional Orientation
Heterogeneity

TMT members are first
classified to 1 of 16 work
function coding categories
(reference Table 2). Then, a
variation of the HerfindahlHirschman Index is calculated
to determine the degree of
heterogeneity, where H is the
index concentration score and
p is the percentage of
executives classified in each
of the 16 functional
classifications. H = 1 – Σ
(p i )2, where i = 1-16

(Hambrick, Cho, & Chen,
1996) / Capital IQ
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Independent Variables (continued):
Variable
Global Strategic Posture

Operationalization

Reference / Data Source

The variable is a composite
measure of three dimensions:
(1) foreign sales, (2) foreign
production, and (3) geographic
diversity. Foreign sales is
calculated as the percentage of
foreign sales revenue to total
sales revenue. Foreign
production is determined as
the percentage of foreignowned assets to total assets,
and (3) geographic diversity
gauges the extent to which a
firm has subsidiaries in any of
the ten world cultural zones
identified by Ronen and
Shenkar (1985). A presence
in each zone counts as 0.10.
The three indicators are then
summed to generate the
composite measure.

(Carpenter & Fredrickson,
2001) / Capital IQ
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TABLE 3 (continued)
Control Variables:
Variable

Operationalization

Reference / Data Source

Firm Size

natural logarithm of the firm's
number of employees

(Smith, Smith, Olian, Sims,
O'Bannon, & Scully, 1994) /
Capital IQ

Firm Age

number of years the firm has
existed

(Michel & Hambrick, 1992) /
Capital IQ

TMT Size

number of executives
determined to be part of the
TMT per the operationalized
definition
industry dummy variable that
differentiates a firm as being
either primarily manufacturing
oriented or primarily service
oriented

(Simmons, Pelled, & Smith,
1999) / Capital IQ

Primary Industry Participation
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(Thomas, 2006) / Capital IQ

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Means, standard deviations, and correlations for each variable including all four
individually analyzed dependent variables, are reported in Table 4. Upon examination of the
correlation magnitudes and the results of the regression diagnostics, it was determined that
multicollinearity was not a significant issue (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1996).
Moreover, while the natural log of firm size is utilized for the analysis, Table 2 presents the
untransformed values of the mean and standard deviation to provide a more clear account of the
data. Similarly, for the independent variables of global strategic posture, organizational tenure
heterogeneity, educational background heterogeneity, and functional orientation heterogeneity,
uncentered means are provided.
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TABLE 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Pearson Correlations
Variable

Mean

s.d.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

1. Return on Assets (dv)

4.32

6.69

2. Return on Equity (dv)

18.04

103.22

0.28 ***

3. Return on Sales (dv)

9.03

35.33

0.47 ***

0.09

4. Composite Measure of ROA, ROE, & ROS (dv)

0.00

0.72

0.81 ***

0.64 ***

5. Global Strategic Posture

1.29

0.61

0.12 *

0.12 *

0.08

6. Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity

0.60

0.31

0.00

0.00

0.10

7. Educational Heterogeneity

0.57

0.20 -0.01

0.06

-0.04

0.00

-0.01

0.32 ***

8. Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

0.73

0.12

0.09

0.06

0.01

0.07

0.00

0.30 ***

9. Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)

27228

52129

0.25

0.09

0.32 ***

0.31 ***

0.32 *** -0.13 *

0.09

-0.11

63.25

71.03

0.04 ***

0.03

0.14 *

0.10

0.19 *** -0.07

0.08

-0.14 *

0.36 ***

0.50

0.50

0.07

0.09

0.19 ***

0.16 **

0.09

-0.05

0.06

11.31

6.60

0.08

0.08

0.16 **

0.15 *

0.02

-0.15 **

0.59 ***

10. Firm Age (years)
11. Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
12. TMT Size

Notes: Mean and standard deviation values of Variable 9 (Firm Size) reflect untransformed data.
Mean values of variables 5, 6, 7, and 8 (Independent Variables) reflect uncentered data.
t

p<0.10
* p<0.05

** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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11.

0.72 **

n = 300

Two-tailed test of significance

10.

0.15 *
t

0.05

0.11 *

t

-0.04

0.00

0.21 *** -0.17 **

0.08
t

-0.03
0.28 ***

0.19 ***

Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression was used to test all six hypotheses.
As there were four different dependent variables (firm performance outcomes) to evaluate, there
were also several iterations of hierarchical OLS regression analysis that were performed. Thus,
several tables of analysis are presented; however, all tables present the analysis in the same
manner.
Each table is labeled in the title bar with the firm performance dependent variable that is
being utilized for analysis. The first model in each table includes only the control variables in
the regression. The second model in each table then adds the main effects (i.e. independent)
variables. It is in this second model, within each table, where hypotheses 1, 2, and/or 3 are tested.
Finally, the third model in each table then adds the interaction terms to the regression analysis; in
this model, hypotheses 4, 5, and/or 6 are tested. Overall model statistics are presented in the
bottom portion of the table. It is also noted that unstandardized regression coefficients are
employed because standardized regression coefficients for interaction terms lead to erroneous
results (Aiken & West, 1991). Finally, since all six hypotheses developed herein predict a
relationship in a specific direction and the moderating effects in the reverse direction are not
meaningful (i.e. firms actively seeking less global involvement), one-tailed tests of significance
were also employed (Borenstein et al., 1997).
In an attempt to keep the results clear, the findings are presented in subsections by each
of the four firm performance dependent variables that were examined: (1) ROA, (2) ROS, (3)
ROE, and (4) Composite Measure of ROA, ROS, and ROE. Furthermore, in each section,
regression analyses results are first presented using all the control variables and only the TMT
heterogeneity variable of interest. Then, a full model analysis is presented where all the control
variables and all the TMT heterogeneity variables collected in the study are presented.
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Return on Assets
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity. Table 5 reports the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of ROA and the specific independent
variable of TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity. Within Table 5, Model 1 only introduces
the control variables. The overall model is statistically significant (p<.001). As in previous
studies (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981), a positive and significant (p<.001)
relationship between firm size and firm performance is found. Of interest as well, a negative and
significant (p<.05) relationship is found between TMT size and firm performance. This is
consistent with Organizational Behavior literature, which has found that increasing team size
hinders group outcomes (Liden et al., 2004; Wagner, 1995).
Model 2 in Table 5 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables
organizational tenure heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001), however, no new statistically significant relationships are
uncovered.
Finally, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from model
2. Model 3 in Table 5 shows good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction
between global strategic posture, organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is
found to be statistically significant (p<.10). These results find initial support for Hypothesis 4;
they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between
organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 5
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = ROA)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-3.75 *

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size

1.07 ***
0.00
0.88
-0.12 *

Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture

Model 2 (H1)
-3.82 *

Model 3 (H4)
-3.45 *

1.03 ***
-0.01
0.98
-0.13 *

1.01 ***
0.00
0.96
-0.13 *

-0.69
0.69

-1.10
0.74

Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity

-3.49

R2

0.08
0.06
6.27 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.08
0.00
0.06
4.39 ***

t

0.09
0.01
0.07
4.13 ***

Educational Background Heterogeneity. For the hierarchical OLS regression output of
firm performance using the dependent variable of ROA and the specific independent variable of
TMT educational background heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered for the
independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed to
report these insignificant findings.
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity. Table 6 reports the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of ROA and the specific independent
variable of TMT functional orientation heterogeneity. Within Table 6, Model 1 analysis and
results are exactly the same as in Table 5. Thus, findings too are identical.
Model 2 in Table 6 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables TMT
functional orientation heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, greater TMT functional
orientation heterogeneity is positively and significantly (p<.05) associated with firm
performance.
Then again, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from
Model 2. Model 3 in Table 6 shows good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the
interaction between global strategic posture, TMT functional orientation heterogeneity, and firm
performance is found to be statistically significant (p<.10). These results find initial support for
Hypothesis 6; they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship
between TMT functional orientation heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 6
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = ROA)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-3.75 *

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size

1.07 ***
0.00
0.88
-0.12 *

Main Effects
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture

Model 2 (H3)
-8.44 **

Model 3 (H6)
-8.32 **

1.03 ***
0.00
0.97
-0.11 t

1.00 ***
0.00
1.01 t
-0.09

5.63 *
0.59

5.40 *
0.63

Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

6.67

R2

0.08
0.07
6.27 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.09
0.01
0.07
4.94 ***

t

0.10
0.01
0.08
4.53 ***

Aiken and West (1991:12) suggest that once a significant interaction is obtained, the
interaction should be plotted to “sharpen our understanding of its meaning.” For my plot, the xaxis represents TMT functional orientation heterogeneity, and the y-axis represents firm
performance, measured as ROA. Values of global strategic posture, the intervening variable
represented on the z-axis, were chosen to compute slopes. Since TMT functional orientation
heterogeneity is continuous, the researcher is free to choose any value within the full range of the
variable (Aiken & West, 1991). The values of z, however, should be sensible and within the
observed range. In following with common practice (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003),
therefore, I chose one standard deviation above and below the mean to represent the high and
low values. Figure 8 displays the graphical representation of my plotted result.
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Firm Performance

Interactive Effects of Global Strategic Posture
and Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
on Firm Performance (ROA)

High
Global Strategic
Posture
Low
Global Strategic
Posture

-1 sd Functional Orientation Heterogeneity +1 sd
Firm Performance in High Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8244, SD = .0321;
Low TMT Orgnizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .6391, SD = .1269; t = 12.2596, p < .001. Firm Performance in Low
Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8196, SD = .0379; Low TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .6510, SD = .1062; t = 12.9489, p < .001.

FIGURE 8
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I also previously described three patterns of interactions between two continuous
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) and hypothesized that the moderator
would act as an “enhancing” interaction, where the predictor and moderator variables affect the
outcome variable in the same direction so that their combined effect is stronger than either
individual effect. From my plot, it may be noted that consistent with Hypothesis 6, global
strategic posture positively and significantly (p<.10) moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT functional orientation heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus,
high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of TMT functional orientation
heterogeneity significantly strengthen firm performance.
To conclude Table 6’s analysis, a t-test was employed to determine whether significant
mean differences existed between high and low TMT functional orientation heterogeneity of firm
performance and high global strategic posture. The means were found to be significantly
different (p<.001). The same test was exercised for high and low TMT functional orientation
heterogeneity of firm performance and low global strategic posture. These means were also
found to be significantly different (p<.001). These results, noted in the caption of Figure 8,
provide further support for the moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis 6. Thus, the
level of global strategic posture moderates the relationship between TMT functional orientation
heterogeneity and firm performance: high levels of global strategic posture “enhance” the
positive relationship between TMT functional orientation heterogeneity and firm performance. It
may be noted that low levels of global strategic posture also “enhance” the same relationship but
to a lesser degree (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286).
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Full Model. Table 7 reports the hierarchical OLS regression output of firm performance
using the dependent variable of ROA and all three TMT heterogeneity independent variables to
present a full model analysis. Within Table 7, Model 1 analysis and results again are exactly the
same as in Table 5 and Table 6. Thus, findings are once again identical as well.
Model 2 in Table 7 then introduces the direct effects of all the TMT heterogeneity
variables and global strategic posture. This model is also found to be statistically significant
(p<.001). Consistent again with Hypothesis 3, greater TMT functional orientation heterogeneity
is positively and significantly (p<.05) associated with firm performance.
Finally, Model 3 describes the relationship between the moderator, each of the three
forms of TMT heterogeneity individually, and firm performance. Model 3 in Table 7 shows
good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction between global strategic posture,
organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is found to be statistically significant
(p<.05). These results find initial support for Hypothesis 4 as were also found in Table 5; they
show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between
organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 7
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = ROA)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-3.75 *

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size

1.07 ***
0.00
0.88
-0.12 *

Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Educational Heterogeneity
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture

Model 2 (H1, H2, H3)
-8.11 **

Model 3 (H4, H5, H6)
-7.57 **

1.03 ***
0.00
1.03 t
-0.12 t

0.98 ***
0.00
1.08 t
-0.10 t

-0.84
-0.41
6.01 *
0.64

-1.25
0.05
5.56 *
0.71

Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Educational Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

-4.20 *
3.28
6.00

R2

0.08
0.07
6.27 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.09
0.02
0.07
3.76 ***

0.11
0.02
0.08
3.22 ***

Again, following prior research recommendation (Aiken & West, 1991:12), once a
significant interaction is obtained, the interaction should be plotted to “sharpen our
understanding of its meaning.” For this plot, the x-axis represents TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity, and the y-axis represents firm performance, measured as ROA. Values of global
strategic posture, the intervening variable represented on the z-axis, were then once again chosen
to compute slopes. For reasons previously described, I chose one standard deviation above and
one standard deviation below the mean to represent the high and low values. Figure 9 displays
the graphical representation of my plotted result.
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Firm Performance

Interactive Effects of Global Strategic Posture
and Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
on Firm Performance (ROA)

Low
Global Strategic
Posture
High
Global Strategic
Posture

-1 sd Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity +1 sd
Firm Performance in High Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8227, SD = .1740;
Low TMT Orgnizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .4164, SD = .1665; t = 14.6107, p < .001. Firm Performance in Low
Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8532, SD = .1863; Low TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .2909, SD = .1959; t = 18.0130, p < .001.

FIGURE 9
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Again, I previously described three patterns of interactions between two continuous
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) and hypothesized that the moderator
would act as an “enhancing” interaction, where the predictor and moderator variables affect the
outcome variable in the same direction so that their combined effect is stronger than either
individual effect. From my plot, it may be noted that consistent with Hypothesis 4, global
strategic posture negatively and significantly (p<.05) moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus,
high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity significantly weaken firm performance.
To conclude Table 7’s analysis, a t-test was employed to determine whether significant
mean differences existed between high and low TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity of firm
performance and high global strategic posture. The means were found to be significantly
different (p<.001). The same test was exercised for high and low TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity of firm performance and low global strategic posture. These means were also
found to be significantly different (p<.001). These results, noted in the caption of Figure 9,
provide further support for the moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis 4. Thus, the
level of global strategic posture moderates the relationship between TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity and firm performance: high levels of global strategic posture “enhance” the
negative relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
Interestingly, here it may be noted that low levels of global strategic posture actually “buffer”
the same relationship (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286).
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Return on Sales
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity. Table 8 reports the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of ROS and the specific independent
variable of TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity. Within Table 8, Model 1 only introduces
the control variables. The overall model is statistically significant (p<.001). A positive and
significant (p<.001) relationship is found between firm size and firm performance. Moreover, a
significant (p<.001) relationship is also found between primary industry participation (service
providing versus manufacturing) and firm performance. Finally, a negative and significant
(p<.10) relationship is found between TMT size and firm performance.
Model 2 in Table 8 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables
organizational tenure heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001), however, no new statistically significant relationships are
uncovered.
Finally, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from model
2. Model 3 in Table 8 shows good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction
between global strategic posture, organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is
found to be statistically significant (p<.10). These results find initial support for Hypothesis 4;
they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between
organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 8
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-44.12 ***

Model 2 (H1)
-45.98 ***

Model 3 (H4)
-44.25 ***

5.86 ***
0.03
12.97 ***
-0.49 t

5.88 ***
0.02
12.50 ***
-0.46

5.82 ***
0.03
12.40 ***
-0.47

5.84
-1.45

3.93
-1.21

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture
Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity

-16.44

R2

0.14
0.12
11.86 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.14
0.00
0.12
8.04 ***

t

0.15
0.01
0.13
7.22 ***

Educational Background Heterogeneity. For the hierarchical OLS regression output of
firm performance using the dependent variable of ROS and the specific independent variable of
TMT educational background heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered for the
independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed to
report these insignificant findings.
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity. For the hierarchical OLS regression output of
firm performance using the dependent variable of ROS and the specific independent variable of
TMT functional orientation heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered for the
independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed to
report these insignificant findings either.
Full Model. Table 9 reports the hierarchical OLS regression output of firm performance
using the dependent variable of ROS and all three TMT heterogeneity independent variables to
present a full model analysis. Within Table 9, Model 1 analysis and results again are exactly the
same as in Table 8. Thus, findings are once again identical as well.
Model 2 in Table 9 then introduces the direct effects of all the TMT heterogeneity
variables and global strategic posture. This model is also found to be statistically significant
(p<.001). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, greater TMT functional orientation heterogeneity is
positively and significantly (p<.05) associated with firm performance.
Finally, Model 3 describes the relationship between the moderator, each of the three
forms of TMT heterogeneity individually, and firm performance. Model 3 in Table 9 shows
good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction between global strategic posture,
organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is found to be statistically significant
at the p<.05 level. These results find initial support for Hypothesis 4 as were also found in Table
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8; they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between
organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 9
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-44.12 ***

Model 2 (H1, H2, H3)
-53.98 ***

Model 3 (H4, H5, H6)
-51.74 ***

5.86 ***
0.03
12.97 ***
-0.49 t

5.86 ***
0.03
12.64 ***
-0.46

5.68 ***
0.03
12.87 ***
-0.47

6.71
-6.91
15.64
-1.57

4.70
-6.42
16.43
-1.48

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Educational Heterogeneity
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture
Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Educational Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

-20.55 *
26.94 t
-13.48

R2

0.14
0.12
11.86 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.14
0.00
0.12
6.14 ***

0.16
0.01
0.12
4.84 ***

Again, following prior research recommendation (Aiken & West, 1991), the interaction is
plotted to better understand the relationship. For this plot, the x-axis represents TMT
organizational tenure heterogeneity, and the y-axis represents firm performance, measured as
ROS. Values of global strategic posture, the intervening variable represented on the z-axis, are
once again chosen to compute slopes. And similarly again, I have chosen one standard deviation
above and below the mean to represent the high and low values. Figure 10 displays the graphical
representation of my plotted result.
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Firm Performance

Interactive Effects of Global Strategic Posture
and Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
on Firm Performance (ROS)

Low
Global Strategic
Posture
High
Global Strategic
Posture

-1 sd Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity +1 sd
Firm Performance in High Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8227, SD = .1740;
Low TMT Orgnizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .4164, SD = .1665; t = 14.6107, p < .001. Firm Performance in Low
Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8532, SD = .1863; Low TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .2909, SD = .1959; t = 18.0130, p < .001.

FIGURE 10
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Again, I previously described three patterns of interactions between two continuous
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) and hypothesized that the moderator
would act as an “enhancing” interaction, where the predictor and moderator variables affect the
outcome variable in the same direction so that their combined effect is stronger than either
individual effect. From my plot, it may be noted that consistent with Hypothesis 4, global
strategic posture negatively and significantly (p<.05) moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus,
high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity significantly weaken firm performance.
To conclude Table 9’s analysis, a t-test was employed to determine whether significant
mean differences existed between high and low TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity of firm
performance and high global strategic posture. The means were found to be significantly
different (p<.001). The same test was exercised for high and low TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity of firm performance and low global strategic posture. These means were also
found to be significantly different (p<.001). These results, noted in the caption of Figure 10,
provide further support for the moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis 4. Thus, the
level of global strategic posture moderates the relationship between TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity and firm performance: high levels of global strategic posture “enhance” the
negative relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
Again as with the dependent variable of ROA, it should be noted that low levels of global
strategic posture actually “buffer” the same relationship (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003:
285-286).
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Return on Equity
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity. For the hierarchical OLS regression output of
firm performance using the dependent variable of ROE and the specific independent variable of
TMT educational background heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered for the
independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed to
report these insignificant findings.
Educational Background Heterogeneity. For the hierarchical OLS regression output of
firm performance using the dependent variable of ROE and the specific independent variable of
TMT educational background heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered for the
independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed to
report these insignificant findings either.
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity. Moreover, for the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of ROE and the specific independent
variable of TMT functional orientation heterogeneity, no significant relationships are uncovered
for the independent variables and the testing of moderation. No table was, therefore, constructed
to report these insignificant findings.
Full Model. Finally, for the hierarchical OLS regression output of firm performance
using the dependent variable of ROE and all three TMT heterogeneity independent variables to
represent the full model analysis, no significant relationships are uncovered. Alas, no table was,
therefore, constructed to report these insignificant findings either.
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Composite Measure of Return on Assets, Return on Sales, and Return on Equity
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity. Table 10 reports the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of the composite measure of ROA,
ROS, and ROE and the specific independent variable of TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity. Within Table 10, Model 1 only introduces the control variables. The overall
model is statistically significant (p<.001). A positive and significant (p<.001) relationship is
found between firm size and firm performance. Moreover, a significant (p<.01) relationship is
also found between primary industry participation (service providing versus manufacturing) and
firm performance.
Model 2 in Table 10 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables
organizational tenure heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001), however, no new statistically significant relationships are
uncovered.
Finally, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from model
2. Model 3 in Table 10 shows good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction
between global strategic posture, organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is
found to be statistically significant (p<.10). These results find initial support for Hypothesis 4;
they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between
organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 10
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = Composite Measure of ROA,ROE,ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-1.04 ***

Model 2 (H1)
-1.09 ***

Model 3 (H4)
-1.05 ***

0.12 ***
0.00
0.22 **
-0.01

0.11 ***
0.00
0.23 **
-0.01 t

0.11 ***
0.00
0.22 **
-0.01 t

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture

0.00
0.08

Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity

-0.04
0.08

-0.33

R2

0.12
0.11
9.92 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.12
0.00
0.11
6.82 ***

t

0.13
0.01
0.11
6.14 ***

Educational Background Heterogeneity. Table 11 reports the hierarchical OLS
regression output of firm performance using the dependent variable of the composite measure of
ROA, ROS, and ROE and the specific independent variable of TMT educational background
heterogeneity. Within Table 11, Model 1 analysis and results are exactly the same as in Table
10. Thus, findings too are identical.
Model 2 in Table 11 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables TMT
educational background heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001), however, no new statistically significant relationships are
uncovered.
Then again, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from
Model 2. Model 3 in Table 11 shows good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the
interaction between global strategic posture, TMT educational background heterogeneity, and
firm performance is found to be statistically significant (p<.10). These results find initial support
for Hypothesis 5; they show a moderating influence of global strategic posture on the
relationship between TMT educational background heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 11
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = Composite Measure of ROA,ROE,ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-1.04 ***

Model 2 (H2)
-1.16 ***

Model 3 (H5)
-1.16 ***

0.12 ***
0.00
0.22 **
-0.01

0.12 ***
0.00
0.23 **
-0.01

0.11 ***
0.00
0.23 **
-0.01

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Educational Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture

0.12
0.08

Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Educational Heterogeneity

0.14
0.08

0.54

R2

0.12
0.11
9.92 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.12
0.00
0.11
6.88 ***

t

0.13
0.01
0.11
6.24 ***

Functional Orientation Heterogeneity. Table 12 reports the hierarchical OLS regression
output of firm performance using the dependent variable of the composite measure of ROA,
ROS, and ROE and the specific independent variable of TMT functional orientation
heterogeneity. Within Table 12, Model 1 analysis and results are exactly the same as in Tables
10 and 11. Thus, findings again are identical too.
Model 2 in Table 12 then introduces the direct effects of the independent variables TMT
functional orientation heterogeneity and global strategic posture. This model is found to be
statistically significant (p<.001). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, greater TMT functional
orientation heterogeneity is positively and significantly (p<.05) associated with firm
performance.
Then, Model 3 includes the cross product of the two independent variables from Model 2.
Model 3 in Table 12 shows good overall model fit (p<.001), however, no new statistically
significant relationships are uncovered.
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TABLE 12
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = Composite Measure of ROA,ROE,ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-1.04 ***

Model 2 (H3)
-1.55 ***

Model 3 (H6)
-1.54 ***

0.12 ***
0.00
0.22 **
-0.01

0.12 ***
0.00
0.23 **
-0.01

0.11 ***
0.00
0.23 **
-0.01

0.61 *
0.07

0.59 *
0.08

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture
Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

0.59

R2

0.12
0.11
9.92 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.13
0.01
0.12
7.49 ***

0.14
0.01
0.12
6.63 ***

Full Model. Table 13 reports the hierarchical OLS regression output of firm performance
using the dependent variable of the composite measure of ROA, ROS, and ROE and all three
TMT heterogeneity independent variables to present a full model analysis. Within Table 13,
Model 1 analysis and results again are exactly the same as in Tables 10, 11, and 12. Thus,
findings are once again identical as well.
Model 2 in Table 13 then introduces the direct effects of all the TMT heterogeneity
variables and global strategic posture. This model is also found to be statistically significant
(p<.001). Consistent again with Hypothesis 3, greater TMT functional orientation heterogeneity
is positively and significantly (p<.05) associated with firm performance.
Finally, Model 3 describes the relationship between the moderator, each of the three
forms of TMT heterogeneity individually, and firm performance. Model 3 in Table 13 shows
good overall model fit (p<.001). Most notably, the interaction between global strategic posture,
organizational tenure heterogeneity, and firm performance is found to be statistically significant
(p<.05). Moreover, the interaction between global strategic posture, educational background
heterogeneity, and firm performance is also found to be statistically significant (p<.05). These
results find initial support for Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5. They show a moderating
influence of global strategic posture on the relationship between organizational tenure
heterogeneity and firm performance, and a moderating influence of global strategic posture on
the relationship between educational background heterogeneity and firm performance.
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TABLE 13
Results of Regression Analysis Predicting Firm Performance (DV = Composite Measure of ROA,ROE,ROS)
Variable
Constant

Model 1
-1.04 ***

Model 2 (H1, H2, H3)
-1.55 ***

Model 3 (H4, H5, H6)
-1.55 ***

0.12 ***
0.00
0.22 **
-0.01

0.12 ***
0.00
0.23 *
-0.01

0.11 ***
0.00
0.24 **
-0.01

-0.03
0.02
0.60 *
0.07

-0.07
0.07
0.58 *
0.08

Control Variables
Firm Size: ln(Number of Employees)
Firm Age
Service Provider (vs Manufacturer)
TMT Size
Main Effects
Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Educational Heterogeneity
Functional Orientation Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture
Interactions
Global Strategic Posture x Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Educational Heterogeneity
Global Strategic Posture x Functional Orientation Heterogeneity

-0.46 *
0.70 *
0.41

R2

0.12
0.11
9.92 ***

R2
Adjusted R2
F
n = 300
Unstandardized regression coefficients shown.
One-tailed test of significance
t
p<0.10
* p<0.05
** p<0.01
*** p<0.001
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0.13
0.01
0.11
5.58 ***

0.15
0.02
0.12
4.72 ***

Once again, following prior research recommendations by Aiken and West (1991:12),
when a significant interaction or interactions are obtained, they should be plotted to “sharpen our
understanding” of their meaning. For the first plot, Figure 11, the x-axis represents TMT
organizational tenure heterogeneity, and the y-axis represents firm performance, measured as the
composite measure of ROA, ROS, and ROE. Values of global strategic posture, the intervening
variable represented on the z-axis, are then once again chosen to compute slopes. Moreover, for
reasons previously described, I have chosen one standard deviation above and one standard
deviation below the mean to represent the high and low values. Figure 11 displays the graphical
representation of my plotted result.
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Firm Performance

Interactive Effects of Global Strategic Posture
and Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity
on Firm Performance
(Composite Measure of ROA, ROE, ROS)

Low
Global Strategic
Posture
High
Global Strategic
Posture

-1 sd Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity +1 sd
Firm Performance in High Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8227, SD = .1740;
Low TMT Orgnizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .4164, SD = .1665; t = 14.6107, p < .001. Firm Performance in Low
Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .8532, SD = .1863; Low TMT Organizational
Tenure Heterogeneity: M = .2909, SD = .1959; t = 18.0130, p < .001.

FIGURE 11
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Again, I previously described three patterns of interactions between two continuous
variables (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) and hypothesized that the moderator
would act as an “enhancing” interaction, where the predictor and moderator variables affect the
outcome variable in the same direction so that their combined effect is stronger than either
individual effect. From my plot, it may be noted that consistent with Hypothesis 4, global
strategic posture negatively and significantly (p<.05) moderates the previously proposed linear
relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus,
high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of TMT organizational tenure
heterogeneity significantly weaken firm performance.
To once again provide further support of Table 13’s analysis of this moderating effect, a
t-test was employed to determine whether significant mean differences existed between high and
low TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity of firm performance and high global strategic
posture. The means were found to be significantly different (p<.001). The same test was
exercised for high and low TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity of firm performance and
low global strategic posture. These means were also found to be significantly different
(p<.001). These results, noted in the caption of Figure 11, provide further support for the
moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis 4. Thus, the level of global strategic posture
moderates the relationship between TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm
performance: high levels of global strategic posture “enhance” the negative relationship between
TMT organizational tenure heterogeneity and firm performance. It should once again be noted
that low levels of global strategic posture actually “buffer” the same relationship (Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286).
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For my second plot, Figure 12, from the Table 13 analysis, the x-axis represents TMT
educational background heterogeneity, and the y-axis represents firm performance, measured as
the composite measure of ROA, ROS, and ROE. Values of global strategic posture, the
intervening variable represented on the z-axis, are then once again chosen to compute slopes.
Once again I have chosen one standard deviation above and one standard deviation below the
mean to represent the high and low values. Figure 12 displays the graphical representation of my
plotted result.
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Firm Performance

Interactive Effects of Global Strategic Posture
and Educational Background Heterogeneity
on Firm Performance
(Composite Measure of ROA, ROE, ROS)
High
Global Strategic
Posture

Low
Global Strategic
Posture

-1 sd

Educational Heterogeneity

+1 sd

Firm Performance in High Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity: M = .7103, SD =
.0521; Low TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity: M = .4284, SD = .1748; t = 13.3845, p < .001. Firm Performance in
Low Global Strategic Posture: High TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity: M = .7134, SD = .0511; Low TMT
Educational Background Heterogeneity: M = .4163, SD = .1846; t = 13.4329, p < .001.

FIGURE 12
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I previously described three patterns of interactions between two continuous variables
(Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286) and hypothesized that the moderator would act
as an “enhancing” interaction, where the predictor and moderator variables affect the outcome
variable in the same direction so that their combined effect is stronger than either individual
effect. From my plot, it may be noted that consistent with Hypothesis 5, global strategic posture
positively and significantly (p<.05) moderates the previously proposed linear relationship
between TMT educational background heterogeneity and firm performance. Thus, high levels of
global strategic posture and high levels of TMT educational background heterogeneity
significantly strengthen firm performance.
To conclude Table 13’s analysis, a t-test was employed to determine whether significant
mean differences existed between high and low TMT educational background heterogeneity of
firm performance and high global strategic posture. The means were found to be significantly
different (p<.001). The same test was exercised for high and low TMT educational background
heterogeneity of firm performance and low global strategic posture. These means were also
found to be significantly different (p<.001). These results, noted in the caption of Figure 12,
provide further support for the moderating relationship proposed in Hypothesis 5. Thus, the
level of global strategic posture moderates the relationship between TMT educational
background heterogeneity and firm performance: high levels of global strategic posture
“enhance” the positive relationship between TMT educational background heterogeneity and
firm performance. Here it may also once again be noted that low levels of global strategic
posture actually “buffer” the same relationship (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003: 285-286).
To conclude my analysis and present the results in a more concise manner, Table 14 has been
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created to summarize the significant findings from the testing of all six hypotheses. The
synopsis is as follows.
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TABLE 14
Summary of Hypotheses Testing
H1:

Greater TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity is negatively associated with Firm Performance.
- hypothesis NOT supported

H2:

Greater TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity is positively associated with Firm Performance.
- hypothesis NOT supported

H3:

Greater TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity is positively associated with Firm Performance.
- hypothesis SUPPORTED

H4:

-

Table 6 - DV=ROA - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta statistically
significant (p=.0340)

-

Table 7 - DV=ROA - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta statistically
significant (p=.0310)

-

Table 12 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) beta statistically significant (p=.0310)

-

Table 13 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) beta statistically significant (p=.0380)

Global Strategic Posture negatively moderates the previously proposed linear relationship between
TMT Organizational Tenure Heterogeneity and Firm Performance.
- hypothesis SUPPORTED
-

Table 5 - DV=ROA - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta statistically
significant (p=.0595)

-

Table 7 - DV=ROA - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta
statistically significant (p=.0360) - interaction plotted as Figure 9

-

Table 8 - DV=ROS - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta statistically
significant (p=.0750)

-

Table 9 - DV=ROS - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta
statistically significant (p=.0435) - interaction plotted as Figure 10

-

Table 10 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) beta statistically significant (p=.0830)

-

Table 13 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant
(p<.001) - beta statistically significant (p=.0300) - interaction plotted as Figure 11
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TABLE 14 (continued)
Summary of Hypotheses Testing

H5:

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed linear relationship between
TMT Educational Background Heterogeneity and Firm Performance.
- hypothesis SUPPORTED

H6:

-

Table 9 - DV=ROS - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta statistically
significant (p=.0815)

-

Table 11 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) beta statistically significant (p=.0695)

-

Table 13 - DV=Composite Measure - overall model statistically significant
(p<.001) - beta statistically significant (p=.0385) - interaction plotted as Figure 12

Global Strategic Posture positively moderates the previously proposed linear relationship between
TMT Functional Orientation Heterogeneity and Firm Performance.
- hypothesis SUPPORTED
-

Table 6 - DV=ROA - overall model statistically significant (p<.001) - beta
statistically significant (p=.0815) - interaction plotted as Figure 8
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DISCUSSION

I began my study by revisiting the idea of whether top-level executive characteristics
affect organizational level performance. While past research has found several differing
relationships between Top Management Team (TMT) heterogeneity and firm performance (e. g.
Goll, Sambharya, Tucci, 2001; Murray, 1989; Norburn & Birley, 1988), most prior TMT studies
have only examined U.S. firms or U.S.-based multinational enterprises, also known as MNEs
(Hambrick, 2007; Lohrke and Burton, 1997). Because of these inconsistent findings and mostly
domestic studies, I posed the question of whether perhaps boundary conditions exist that provide
insight into this quandary. Could the increasingly global involvement of these MNEs, measured
as global strategic posture in my study, shed light on these inconsistent findings to date? My
investigation lies at the crossroads between the domains of International Business and Strategic
Management, where 3,392 top-ranking business executives managing 300 firms headquartered in
31 different countries located across the globe may provide the key to gaining a better
understanding.
In my exploratory analysis, I posited that TMT heterogeneity and global strategic posture
jointly influence firm performance. I first disentangled TMT heterogeneity into three highly job
related and critical forms: organizational tenure heterogeneity, educational background
heterogeneity, and functional orientation heterogeneity (Olson, Parayitam, & Bao, 2007; Pelled,
Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999). I then tested for a moderating influence between these three forms of
heterogeneity and global strategic posture on firm performance.
I found that the interaction of high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of
organizational tenure heterogeneity significantly weaken firm performance. Conversely, I found
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that the interaction of high levels of global strategic posture and high levels of educational
background heterogeneity significantly strengthen firm performance. Finally, similar to the
educational background results, I found that the interaction of high levels of global strategic
posture and high levels of functional orientation heterogeneity significantly strengthen firm
performance as well. All three moderating influences took the form of “enhancing” interactions
as hypothesized, where the predictor and moderator variable affected the outcome variable in the
same direction, their combined effect stronger than either individual effect (Cohen, Cohen, West,
& Aiken, 2003: 285-286). Thus, my results suggest that a firm’s global strategic posture, their
intensity of global business involvement, in conjunction with the heterogeneous nature of TMT
characteristics does significantly influence firm performance.

Implications: Research and Managerial
My results have important implications for research, for MNEs in general, and for CEOs
and their respective TMTs specifically. First, they illustrate how the concept of TMT
heterogeneity should not be considered as one large measure of dispersion or diversity.
Heterogeneity does indeed take on different forms, and as it appears via this study, these
different forms result in different organizational outcomes when combined with strategic plans to
globalize the firm.
In this respect, organizational tenure, in particular, does reveal that heterogeneity is more
of a double-edged sword. There are advantages and disadvantages to consider from having
certain types of diverse teams. The findings suggest that when heterogeneity presents itself in
the form of a small number of different subgroups or even more specifically, a team with an ingroup and an out-group (i.e. longer tenured executives versus shorter tenured executives),
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dysfunctional conflict may hinder effective group decision making processes. This problem
becomes magnified when increasing amounts of information processing are required by the team
to analyze more complex and demanding issues and business environments. The team
significantly becomes burdened, with organizational outcomes ultimately being affected.
Thus, CEOs, top strategy managers, and the highest-level of human resource (HR)
managers must stay vigilantly aware so that this issue may be addressed. The issue may be
addressed before the fact in the assembly of the TMT; however, this is recognized as a truly
difficult task since there are many variables that go into deciding who should be part of a top
management team. The issue more appropriately may be addressed after the fact by team
building at the highest levels. This is a strategic HR issue in that the TMT needs to be involved
in training, as teams are at all other levels of the organization, to address critical group matters
such as team cohesion, informal communication, social integration and behavioral integration
(Hambrick 1998; Hambrick, 1994; Smith et al., 1994; Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). It is often an
incorrect assumption to believe that HR programs are no longer necessary at the highest echelons
of executive rank. To the contrary, these teams must continually strive towards functioning as a
collective to improve in-group well being (Earley & Gibson, 1998; Hofstede, 1980) and
consequently firm performance.
With respect to educational background and functional orientation, teams with higher
levels of these types of heterogeneity appear to strive in the more complex environment of
multinational business. As the call for growing our businesses continues and local and domestic
markets become even more saturated, the stage is set for a continued surge of business across
country lines. With this global march, it again appears that effective information processing is
enhanced by these two types of diversity. Moreover, as it was suggested with organizational
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tenure, in these instances it appears heterogeneity is more about the many subgroups involved
versus only a few. TMTs are made up of educational degrees from fields as varied as
engineering, science, marketing, finance, and law for example. In that same vein, managers
oversee and are responsible for functions as varied as operations, research and development,
sales, treasury, and counsel. Both of these types of heterogeneity appear to bring wider and more
analytical perspective to the strategic practice of information processing and effective decision
making.
Thus, again it the responsibility of CEOs, top strategy managers, and the highest-level of
HR managers to ensure that the TMT remains a team of diverse individuals with many
educational backgrounds and functional orientations represented. It is duly noted that the uppermost echelon of the organization must also strike a balance in the size of the team. Evidence
from the study does illustrate that ultimately a TMT size that is too large begins to have
significant and detrimental effects on firm performance. In summary, the academic and real
world implications are that the theoretical frameworks of upper echelons and information
processing do help predict how executive characteristics and global involvement provide a better
assessment of when heterogeneity may truly be a critical factor for TMTs and MNEs alike.

Limitations and Future Research Directions
There are several limitations to the present study. First, one of my research objectives
was to provide insight into MNEs that are headquartered around the world. While 31 countries
are represented in my sample and this is a more heterogeneous sample than most TMT studies to
date, some countries via random sample are represented in much greater numbers than others.
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For example, the U.S., with the largest sample representation, still accounts for approximately 28
percent of the MNEs examined.
Second, low adjusted R2s are a concern in the empirical analysis. The models, however,
are found to be statistically significant. The relationships may be noted as truly robust because
significant effects are found within the sample of firms from multiple industries. Because of the
highly heterogeneous nature of the sample, the influence of a strategic variable such as global
strategic posture is almost certain to be less prominent, in effect leading to lower R2s (Slater &
Atuahene-Gima, 2004). It may also be noted that while there may be many factors that are
related to a firm’s performance, this exploratory study attempts to isolate a few critical ones in
order to hypothesize and test these important pieces of the TMT-performance puzzle.
Third, accounting standards vary from country to country. These variations may be cause
for concern with respect to the moderator and firm performance variables employed in my study.
The firms in my sample, however, are also all publicly-traded firms. This fact should provide
some control over the accounting and reporting of performance measures as more and more
countries align themselves with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Even for those MNEs that follow U.S.
GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Practices) and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB), it may be noted that these two standards are converging, providing investors with
greater transparency and a more unified accounting code. The IASB and the FASB published a
joint memorandum of understanding known as the Norwalk Agreement in 2002 to work towards
removing differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP (Epstein & Jermakowicz, 2008). Lastly,
the use of the composite measure of firm performance may also address this concern as several
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measures of firm performance (i.e. ROA, ROS, and ROE) are first standardized and then
averaged to generate this measure of measures.
Finally, by addressing TMT heterogeneity, global strategic posture, and firm
performance via the “intervening processes” (Lawrence, 1997:4) of functional and dysfunctional
conflict, I need to also address research concerns (Hambrick, 2007; Lawrence, 1997) about the
black box that exists between the organizational demographic variables and corresponding
organizational outcomes. This intervening process explanation treats subjective concepts, such
as conflict and effective decision making processes as mediators between the demographic
predictors and firm performance outcomes. As previously mentioned, I used these concepts in
my exploratory study to understand factors produced by the TMT demographic distributions;
these concepts led me to develop my testable hypotheses.
These limitations, however, also lead to opportunities for future research. With respect to
the black box issues discussed, future research may test the subjective concepts posited to be
mediating or linking this study’s independent and dependent variables. As noted, however, this
will take researchers with an “an interest in and facility with both microprocesses and macroorganizational phenomena” (Hambrick, 2007: 337). As initial relationships are uncovered, as in
this study, future research can continue by then peering within the black box. As this occurs,
more elaborate relationships will be unmasked, and theory will ultimately be strengthened.
Future research should also test the measure of a firm’s global intensity using other
measures, such as environmental uncertainty for example. This too will strengthen the findings
and make them more robust. Moreover, future studies should test others moderators as well. It
is my preliminary assessment that TMT heterogeneity has encountered mixed results to date
because there are boundary conditions that exist, which require theoretical forethought and
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analytical experimentation to uncover. Future samples of TMTs headquartered in countries
throughout the world will also prove beneficial in testing other possible moderators such as
cultural boundaries, executive compensation boundaries, managerial boundaries (i.e. strength of
the board of directors versus that of the TMT), growth stage of the firm (i.e. small-to-medium
sized enterprises, SMEs, versus MNEs), and market boundaries (emerging versus developing
versus developed). My dataset was created with these future studies already in mind. Some data
has already been collected to continue my academic career moving forward; more will be
required in the future. Finally, firm performance variables will also be continued to be collected
to create two and three year averages of firm performance, which may provide a more complete
picture of the strategic formulation, implementation, and evaluation process and corresponding
organizational outcomes.

Conclusion
In conclusion, longitudinal studies may prove most fruitful as they will provide greater
perspective and perhaps uncover insightful dynamic models where relationships are not
explicitly unidirectional (Lawrence, 1997) – for example, bounded TMT heterogeneity leads to
firm performance and consequently firm performance then leads to further heterogeneity and so
on. This study begins to explore these concepts, which overlap the research domains of
international business and strategic management. My research illustrates the value of continuing
to explore Top Management Team issues and why they are important on both a macro and micro
level. MNE TMTs, in particular, face difficult challenges as they take their firms global. They
need to heed the cautionary words and take note of the implications of these preliminary
findings: heterogeneity is indeed a double-edged sword. These findings advance the theoretical
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perspectives of upper echelons and information processing (Daft, Bettenhausen, & Tyler, 1993;
Galbraith, 1973; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), and finally, they support the relevance of top
managers.
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